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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 960702-CA

vs.

Priority No. 2

JOHN TETMYER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Tetmyer on October 3, 1996 is
considered the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code §78-2a-3 (2)(f).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 30, 1997, within 30 days of the entry
of judgement. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
this appeal is timely.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
Mr. Tetmyer appeals from his conviction following the entry of his conditional
pleas of guilty to the Information charging him with Possession of a Controlled

Substance in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (2)(a)(l); Possession of Marijuana in
violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (2)(a)(l); Driving Under the Influence in violation of
Utah Code §41-6-44(1 )(a); Possession of Paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code §5837a-5; and Open Container in violation of Utah Code §41-6-44.20(2). Specifically, Mr.
Tetmyer challenges the Trial Court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1. On December 26, 1995, Mr. Tetmyer was charged in an Information with
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 3rd degree Felony, in violation of a Utah
Code §58-37-8 (2)(a)(l); Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class "B"
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (2)(a)(l); Driving under the Influence,
a class "B" misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code §41-6-44 (1)(a); Possession of
Paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §58-37a-5; and
Open Container, a class "C" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §41-6-44.20 (2).
2. On February 16, 1996, a Preliminary Hearing was held and Mr. Tetmyer was
bound over for trial on all counts of the Information.
3. On May 21, 1996, Mr. Tetmyer filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. A copy
of that Motion is contained in Addendum B.
4. On May 22, 1996, an Evidentiary Hearing was held on Mr. Tetmyer's Motion
to Suppress Evidence. On the same day, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was
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denied.
5. On October 3, 1996, Mr. Tetmyer entered conditional pleas of guilty to all
counts of the Information.
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
The sentencing was held on October 3, 1996, At that time, the Trial Court
imposed the following sentence: imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for a term not
to exceed five years and a fine in the amount of fourteen hundred eighty dollars
($1480.00). The sentence was stayed upon the condition that Defendant paid the fine
before leaving the courthouse. Defendant was placed on informal probation for twentyfour months.
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on October 30, 1996.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented for appeal is whether Trooper Rick Eldredge had
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Tetmyer.
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion are mixed questions of law
and fact. The underlying findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, affording no measure
of discretion to the Trial Court. State v. Patefield.
Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1996).

3

P.2d

, 303 Utah Adv.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 22, 1996, a hearing was held on Mr. Tetmyer's Motion to Suppress
Evidence. At the hearing, Trooper Rick Eldredge testified that he was on duty on
December 23, 1995. (T. 4) Trooper Eldredge and a Monticello City Police Officer were
both taking their break at the Trailside convenience store. (T. 5) Both were in uniform
and their cars were parked on the south side of the store. (T. 5) At approximately 2:00
p.m., Trooper Eldredge noticed Mr. Tetmyer's passenger nearly fall on the front step as
he entered the store. (T. 5) He walked past the trooper, who observed that he had
very red, glassy eyes. (T. 5) The passenger went directly to the restroom and after he
left the store, he had difficulty with balance, nearly falling down as he got into the
passenger side of Mr. Tetmyer's vehicle. (T. 5) Trooper Eldredge brought this
information to the attention of Officer Eberling. (T. 5)
Officer Eberling watched Mr. Tetmyer who was at the gasoline pump. (T. 17)
Conceding that he was quite a distance from Mr. Tetmyer and that Mr. Tetmyer was on
the opposite side of the vehicle, the officer observed that Mr. Tetmyer's hand was on
his vehicle while he was pumping gasoline and surmised that Mr. Tetmyer was using
the vehicle for a balance point. (T. 19) He did not, however, mention this to Trooper
Eldredge. (T. 19) Nor did Officer Eberling notice anything else about Mr. Tetmyer
other than Mr. Tetmyer's failure to remove his sunglasses when he went inside the
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convenience store. (T. 18)
After pumping the gasoline, Mr. Tetmyer entered the store. (T. 5) Mr. Tetmyer
walked directly to the restroom, without removing his sunglasses. (T. 5) Trooper
Eldredge noted that Mr. Tetmyer walked "off line." (T. 5) Neither officer noted the odor
of alcohol. Trooper Eldredge watched Mr. Tetmyer as he walked in the aisles and
watched Mr. Tetmyer pick up Windex and paper towels. (T. 5, 14) Trooper Eldredge
then left the store with Officer Eberling to retrieve a camera for another matter. (T. 5)
Trooper Eldredge and Officer Eberling went to the trooper's vehicle and opened the
trunk and began looking for the camera. (T. 5) After finding the camera, he handed it
to Officer Eberling, who left. (T. 6) Trooper Eldredge situated his trunk, got in his
vehicle to follow Mr. Tetmyer who drove off shortly after Officer Eberling left. (T. 6)
Trooper Eldredge caught up with Mr. Tetmyer as he was leaving Monticello, however
he testified that he observed the vehicle as they went through town. (T. 6) No traffic
violations were noted. Trooper Eldredge activated his emergency lights and stopped
Mr. Tetmyer by GEOTEC, outside of town. (T. 6)

Officer Eberling assisted with the

stop. (T. 8)
The Trial Court held that the factors of making a "bee line" for the restroom and
failing to take off sunglasses were "light" factors that did not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion, unless taken into account with the factor that Mr. Tetmyer failed
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to walk straight and that he was with an intoxicated passenger. (T. 33, 34) With
respect to the issue of walking "on line", the Court asked Trooper Eldredge to mimic the
walk. (T. 15-16) After watching Trooper Eldredge, the Trial Court later reasoned: "I
recognize the difficulty of describing or even mimicking that behavior (walking straight)
because it's kind of a thing that, who was it; Justice Steward or Justice Powell said
about obscenity: 'You know it when you see it, but it's hard to describe' You know, you
can kind of tell, but it is difficult to describe why it is you think someone may be
intoxicated." (T. 33)
The Trial Court further said that Trooper Eldredge was describing that which was
not obvious and that taking into consideration Officer Eberling's testimony, that Trooper
Eldredge was "probably telling the truth." (T. 34)
The Trial Court stated that the fourth factor, an obviously intoxicated passenger,
also gave the trooper sufficient grounds to believe that "there may be drinking going on
in this car" (T. 34) The Trial Court held that sufficient suspicion existed to not only
suspect Mr. Tetmyer for being impaired but for open containers as well. (T. 35)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trooper Rick Eldredge lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory
stop of Mr. Tetmyer. The facts known to the trooper, Mr. Tetmyer's failure to take off
his sunglasses when he entered a convenience store, making a "bee line" for the
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restroom, walking "off line" and the presence of an intoxicated passenger, did not rise
to the level of reasonable suspicion that Mr. Tetmyer was driving under the influence.
The Trial Court incorrectly concluded that the facts known to the trooper and
Officer Eberling's observation that Mr. Tetmyer's hand was on the vehicle while he was
pumping gasoline, were reasonable suspicion that Mr. Tetmyer was driving under the
influence or that he had open containers in the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
Trooper Eldredge's Action Was Not Justified At Its Inception.
It is well established that an officer may stop a person for an investigatory
detention if the officer has a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411,
101 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed. 2d 890 (1981) reh. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Reid v.
Georgia. 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 LEd. 2d 890 (1980). See generally
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Relying on the reasoning in Terry and its progeny, the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the two-part test in determining whether a traffic stop can withstand
constitutional scrunity. State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). The case
at hand focuses only on the first prong: Whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, i d
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Here, the Trial Court concluded that sufficient facts existed to justify the stop of
Mr. Tetmyer. The facts were (1) that Mr. Tetmyer entered the convenience store and
failed to remove his sunglasses, (2) that Mr. Tetmyer made a "bee line" for the
restroom, (3) that Mr. Tetmyer failed to walk "on line" and (4) that Mr. Tetmyer's
passenger was obviously intoxicated. The Trial Court held that the first two factors
were light factors, however, taken in context with the other factors, the trooper had
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Tetmyer for driving under the influence and for open
containers.
The Trial Court failed to articulate how this type of behavior was suspiciously
inconsistent with innocent behavior. The Trial Court failed to take into account that the
trooper was acting on a hunch when he initiated the stop.
Mr. Tetmyer's failure to remove his sunglasses when he entered the
convenience store is not a fact on which one could rationally infer that he was hiding
bloodshot eyes. Likewise, that Mr. Tetmyer walked directly to the restroom is not an
objective fact on which one could rationally infer that he had consumed alcohol,
especially where there is no odor of alcohol.
That the passenger was intoxicated adds little to the reasonable suspicion
analysis because it does not implicate Mr. Tetmyer in any illegal activity. See
generally. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1993) citing State v. Sykes. 840 P.2d
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825 (Utah Ct. App.1992)(Held no reasonable suspicion to detain defendant where
informant told officers about drug usage at a home, which was put under surveillance
and the occupants were aware of the surveillance and defendant entered the home
where he remained for a few minutes before leaving.) See also Ybarra v. Illinois. 444
U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 LEd.2d 737 (1979), reh. den. 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct.
741, 62 L.Ed.2d 737 (1979)("a person's mere propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to
search that person.")
Moreover, being a designated driver cannot be used as a basis to suspect
criminal activity, whether it be that the driver is impaired or that there was drinking in
the vehicle. There are sound policy reasons for having designated drivers and to
subject a driver to being stopped and/or searched would certainly have a chilling effect.
This lack of reasonable suspicion is underscored by Trooper Eldredge's inability
to describe or even mimic Mr. Tetmyer's walking "off line." Yet, the Trial Court found
that Trooper Eldredge was "probably telling the truth" about this matter based on
Officer Eberling's ambiguous testimony.
Officer Eberling testified that he was a considerable distance from Mr. Tetmyer
and that Mr. Tetmyer was on the opposite side of the vehicle. With that preface, Officer
Eberling then claims that Mr. Tetmyer was using the vehicle as a balance point
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because his hand was on the vehicle while he was pumping gasoline.
Officer Eberling's conclusion was based on the briefest of observations. He also
testified that he did not observe Mr. Tetmyer's gait or balance other than noting that Mr.
Tetmyer wore sunglasses when he entered the store. Officer Eberling's conclusion that
Mr. Tetmyer was using his vehicle as a balance point is based on patently absurd
reasoning.
Perhaps most disturbing is that after watching Trooper Eldredge mimic Mr.
Tetmyer's gait, the Trial Court relieved Trooper Eldredge of the obligation to point to
specific and articulable facts; The Court stated that articulating a suspicion about being
intoxicated is analogous to deciding if something is obscene: "You know it when you
see it."1 This reasoning is wholly inconsistent with the dictates of Terry and its
progeny. See also Potter. 40 P.2d at 43 ("Police officer must be able to articualte
some unlawful or suspicious behavior connecting detainee to suspected criminal
activity to justify stop."); State v. Leonard. 825 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)(same).
Thus, to justify the detention, the trooper '"must point to specific, articulable
facts, which together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
Generally, Courts have allowed lay person testimony regarding sobriety. See
Kimball & Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. Article 7 (1996) Presumably this is because such
a conclusion does not require expertise, rather it is based on obvious and distinctive
behavior.

10

reasonable person to conclude defendant had committed or was about to commit a
crime " State v Carner. 812 P 2d 460, 466 (Utah Ct App ), cert, denied, 836 P 2d
1338 (Utah 1992)(quoting State v Trujillo. 739 P 2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct App 1987)
Trooper Eldredge lacked specific, articulable facts and his inferences drawn from those
purported "facts" were not rational
The facts set forth to justify the detention of Mr Tetmyer must be such that would
cause any reasonable officer in a like position to suspect the same criminal conduct
and the same involvement by Mr Tetmyer

The factors lack an objective basis that

would lead a reasonable officer to initiate the same action
Moreover, the trooper's actions were inconsistent with the purported suspicions
Trooper Eldredge ostensibly stopped Mr Tetmyer because he believed that Mr
Tetmyer was impaired He was aware that Mr Tetmyer's companion got into the
passenger side of the vehicle There was absolutely no testimony that there were any
other occupants in that vehicle Yet, his attention was diverted while Mr Tetmyer was
in the store and when he drove off Trooper Eldredge had left the store to get a camera
for Officer Eberling There was no evidence that the need for the camera is immediate,
especially where Officer Eberling was able to provide immediate assistance to Trooper
Eldredge after he stopped Mr Tetmyer
It makes no sense that if the trooper truly believed that Mr Tetmyer was
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impaired, that he would allow him to leave and drive through town in mid-afternoon,
where he could pose a real and imminent danger to others. Similarly, the trooper's
claim about Mr. Tetmyer being impaired is further negated by the fact that the trooper
observed Mr. Tetmyer drive and he noted no driving pattern consistent with driving
under the influence. Indeed, Mr. Tetmyer did not commit even a minor traffic violation.
The factors set forth in this case are analogous to cases where no reasonable
suspicion was found to exist.
Take for instance, State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
There, the occupants were pulled over for possible DUI. The deputy determined that
the driver was not impaired and he extended the stop based on the following factors:
The driver was visibly nervous when he handed the deputy his driver's license, the
occupant did not have a driver's license, neither one of the occupants was the
registered owner of the car, and the deputy noted that the route that they were driving
was not the most direct route for their claimed destination. \jL at 654. This Court held
that there were no facts supporting a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion which
would, in turn, justify the detention after the deputy concluded that the occupants were
not intoxicated.
Likewise, in State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), disagreed with
on other grounds. Lopez. supraT 873 P.2d at 1134 n.3, the detaining officer set forth the
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following factors as forming reasonable suspicion: One defendant (Towers) appeared
to be nervous and failed to make eye contact whereas the other (Robinson) was
talkative and evasive about questions concerning the van, The officers observed a
homemade bed in the back of the van, there was no cold weather gear although the
defendants stated that they were going to Wyoming, the defendants failed to produce
written permission to use the vehicle and the troopers were unable to reach the owner
of the van to confirm the permissive use of the vehicle, jd. at 435-36. This Court held
that such factors did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion:
In sum, we conclude that the trial
court clearly erred in its findings that
the troopers had the reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity necessary to justify
their continued detention and questioning
of Robinson and Towers once the warning
citation had been given and the purposes
of the initial stop had been accomplished.
i d at 436-37.
Godina-Luna. Robinson, and Lopez as well as other appellate cases compel a
finding by this Court that the trooper's action was not justified at it's inception.
Accordingly, the seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. All evidence
seized as the fruit of the unlawful continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun
v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 LEd.2d 441 (1963);
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State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's ruling on
the Motion to Suppress Evidence.
DATED this i ^

day of

1997.
RespectftrHy, submitted:

R O S ^ E REILLY
Att<£rhey for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to Christine Soltis, Office of the
Attorney General, Appellate Division, 160 East 300 South, Heber Wells Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114 and hand-delivered to the Office of the San JuapnCounty
Attorney, at 297 South Main in Monticello, Utah on this S*? day of M ^ Z ^ P ,
1997. .

ILLY
fney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
U.S. Const, amend. IV

II. UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
Utah Const, article 1, section 14

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I. Utah Code S41-6-44(2)(l)
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this state if the person:
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree the renders the person incapable of safely
operating the vehicle.
II. Utah Code §41-6-44.20(2)
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to keep,
carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when
the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains any alcoholic beverage
if the container has been opened, its seal broke, or the contents of the container
partially consumed.
III. Utah Code §58-37-8 (2)(aUI)
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful
(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained from a valid prescription or order, directly from
a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this subsection.
IV. Utah Code §58-37a(1)
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
297 South Main, Monticello
*

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.
JOHN TETMYER,
Defendant.

*

Case No. 9517-377
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

TO: CRAIG HALLS, SAN JUAN COUNTY ATTORNEY
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the following motion will be heard on the 22nd day
of May, 1996, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge.
MOTION
Defendant, John Tetmyer, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby
moves this Court for an order suppressing all evidence and statements obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit:
1. the observations of any law enforcement officer after the seizure;
2. all tangible evidence seized as a result of the seizure; and

3. any statements attributed to the defendant.
This motion is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
all files and records in this case, and such further evidence as may be adduced at the
hearing on this motion.
DATED this 21st day of May, 1996.
submitted:

REILLY
hey for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was hand-delivered to Craig Halls at 297 South Main in Monticello, Utah on this 21st
day of May, 1996.
•^L

mice Bryan
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